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A FATHER’S PRESENCE:
FLORES-VILLAR V. UNITED STATES
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
JEFFREY HOCHSTETLER*

I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law
stands as a bulwark against restrictions based solely on sex. The Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments require the government to consider
1
individuals, not gender stereotypes, when it legislates. Nonetheless,
2
both men and women have faced sex-based discrimination. To
safeguard the right to equal treatment under the law, courts apply
intermediate scrutiny, a form of heightened judicial review, to laws
3
that create classifications based on sex. In Flores-Villar v. United
4
States, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to apply this
5
heightened scrutiny to a statutory scheme that makes it more difficult
for fathers than mothers to transfer U.S. citizenship to their children.
The outcome will depend largely on whether the Court’s exercise of
intermediate scrutiny is vigorous or lenient.
* J.D. and M.A. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law.
1. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Inherent differences between
men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (striking down a state’s
discriminatory adoption statute because it rested on the impermissible stereotype that a father
does not bear as close a relationship with his children as a mother does); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (upholding a state law prohibiting women from practicing law,
reasoning that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases.”) (Bradley, J., concurring).
3. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge . . .
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
4. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1878 (2010).
5. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(g) and 1409(c) (West 2011).
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The Supreme Court’s application of intermediate scrutiny has
6
been inconsistent. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, for
example, the Court said that the government must show an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” in order to successfully defend
7
a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of sex. In Nguyen v.
8
Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, the Court merely
stated that “it must be established” that a statute does not violate
9
equal protection, seemingly ignoring the high burden of justification
10
placed on the government in Hogan. Additionally, the Nguyen Court
dismissed the relevance of sex-neutral alternatives to a law that
11
imposed requirements on fathers but not mothers, even though in a
prior case the Court found the question of sex-neutral alternatives
12
very salient.
In Flores-Villar, the Court may finally clarify what is required of
the government under intermediate scrutiny. It could take a more
stringent approach than it did in Nguyen, considering sex-neutral
alternatives and requiring the Government to shoulder a heavy
burden of justification. More likely, however, the Court will continue
its lenient application of intermediate scrutiny and will accept the
Government’s rationale for the law. This outcome would call into
question the Court’s future commitment to heightened scrutiny in
sex-discrimination cases.
II. FACTS
Ruben Flores-Villar was born in Tijuana, Mexico, on October 7,
13
1974. His father, Ruben Trinidad Floresvillar-Sandez, a United States

6. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
7. See id. at 724 (“[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification
for the classification.” (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979) (quotation marks omitted)).
8. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
9. Id. at 60.
10. See id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In the first sentence of its equal protection
analysis, the majority glosses over the crucial matter of the burden of justification.”).
11. See id. at 64 (majority opinion) (“[T]o require Congress to speak without reference to
the gender of the parent with regard to its objective of ensuring a blood tie between parent and
child would be to insist on a hollow neutrality. . . . The issue is not the use of gender specific
terms instead of neutral ones.”).
12. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (invalidating a sexbased classification where a sex-neutral approach would have achieved the same objectives).
13. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1878 (2010).
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citizen, was sixteen at the time Flores-Villar was born. FloresvillarSandez is not listed on his son’s birth certificate, but acknowledged his
15
paternity with the Civil Registry in Mexico in 1985. Flores-Villar’s
16
mother, Maria Mercedes Negrete, is a citizen and national of Mexico.
When he was two months old, Flores-Villar came to the United States
17
with his father and paternal grandmother for medical treatment. He
remained in the United States and grew up in San Diego with his
father, grandmother, and siblings, but had little contact with his
18
Mexican mother. Floresvillar-Sandez claimed Flores-Villar as a
19
dependent on his tax returns for several years.
In 1997, Flores-Villar was convicted of importing marijuana and
subsequently was removed from the United States on several
20
occasions between 1998 and 2005. In 2006, after illegal entry, he was
charged with “being a deported alien found in the United States after
21
deportation.” Flores-Villar raised the defense that he was a citizen
through his father, but this argument was rejected because his father
did not meet the statutory requirement necessary for passing
22
citizenship to his son. Because Flores-Villar would have been a
citizen if his mother, rather than his father, had been a U.S. citizen, the
present case seeks to resolve whether the statutory requirement
violates equal protection.
In determining whether a U.S. citizen transmits U.S. citizenship to
a child born abroad, courts look to the relevant statute that was in
23
effect at the time of the child’s birth. When Flores-Villar was born, §
1401(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided, in
relevant part:
(a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth:
...

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1878 (2010).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782,
783 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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(7) a person born outside the geographic limits of the United
States . . . of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person,
was physically present in the United States . . . for a period or
periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were
24
after attaining the age of fourteen years.

Because Flores-Villar’s father was only sixteen when Flores-Villar
was born, he could not have been present in the United States for at
25
least five years after turning fourteen. With a father who failed this
“physical presence” requirement, Flores-Villar was prevented from
26
claiming paternally-derived citizenship.
Accordingly, the Government filed a motion in limine in the
Southern District of California seeking to exclude evidence regarding
Flores-Villar’s claim of derivative citizenship. The court granted the
Government’s request, concluding that “no reasonable juror could
find that [the] Defendant could establish derivative citizenship
through his citizen father. Therefore, any evidence of [the]
Defendant’s father’s citizenship, residency, or legitimating acts is not
27
relevant.” Following trial, the court found Flores-Villar guilty of
28
“being a deported alien in the United States after deportation.”
On appeal, Flores-Villar argued that the Immigration and
Nationality Act made “an impermissible classification on the basis of
gender” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
29
protection under the law. Specifically, Flores-Villar argued that the
lengthy physical-presence requirement, which applied to unwed
fathers and not to unwed mothers, unconstitutionally discriminated
against men. Section 1409(c), the provision applicable to mothers,
states:
Notwithstanding the provision of [§ 1401(a)(7)], a person born . . .
outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have
acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother

24. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1974). The current law provides for a shorter physical presence
requirement, allowing a citizen-parent to transfer citizenship to a child born outside the U.S.
where that parent “was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a
period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(g) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
25. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
28. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994.
29. Id. at 995.
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had the nationality of the United States . . . and if the mother had
previously been physically present in the United States . . . for a
30
continuous period of one year.

A mother, then, can transfer U.S. citizenship to her child born
abroad as long as she has been in the U.S. for one year at any time. By
comparison, under the applicable 1974 statute, a father could only
transfer his citizenship if he had been present in the U.S. for ten years.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
31
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While no
similar constitutional provision explicitly applies to the federal
government, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause applies
32
implicitly through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
“All equal protection cases pose the same basic question: Is the
33
government’s classification justified by a sufficient purpose?” That is,
if the government distinguishes between two people for the purpose
of treating them differently under the law, the government must show
that its distinction is justified. All laws challenged under equal
protection must at least meet the “rational-basis test,” which is the
34
minimum level of judicial scrutiny. The rational-basis test is satisfied
if the government shows that its classification is “rationally related to
35
a legitimate state interest.” In effect, this test is very deferential to
36
the government.
Governmental classifications based on race and gender, however,
must meet heightened judicial scrutiny. Laws that distinguish between
persons on the basis of race face strict scrutiny: the government must
show that the racial classification is narrowly tailored to further a

30. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(c) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (extending the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to the federal government via the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
33. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 669 (3d ed.
2006).
34. Id. at 677.
35. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
36. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“[L]egislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result
in some inequality.”).
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37

compelling governmental interest. Laws that distinguish between
persons on the basis of sex, as here, must meet intermediate scrutiny:
the classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and
38
must be substantially related to those objectives.”
A. Impermissible Sex Classifications Based on Stereotypes
The majority of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding sex
discrimination involves laws that benefit women to the disadvantage
39
of men. Many of these cases deal with sex classifications based on
stereotypes about a woman’s role in the family and as a mother. In
40
Caban v. Mohammed, for example, a New York state statute allowed
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of
41
her child by withholding consent. The Supreme Court struck down
the statute, holding it to be an “overbroad generalization in gender42
based classifications.” The Court expressly rejected the state’s claim
that the distinction was justified by “a fundamental difference
between maternal and paternal relations—that a natural mother . . .
43
bears a closer relationship with her child . . . than a father does.”
While the Court recognized that the state had a strong interest in
facilitating adoptions, the “undifferentiated distinction between
unwed mothers and unwed fathers” did not bear a substantial
44
relationship to that interest. Instead, the statute “discriminate[d]
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they
45
have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child.”

37. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
38. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 760; see, e.g., Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (state nursing school only admitted women); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(discriminatory adoption statute precluded fathers from withholding consent to an adoption);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state liquor law disadvantaged men, but not women).
40. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 394 ((quotation marks omitted) (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211
(1977)).
43. Id. at 388 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Transcript of Oral at 41, Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (No. 77-6431).
44. Id. at 394.
45. Id.
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B. Permissible Sex Classifications Based on Biological Difference:
Nguyen v. I.N.S. and Ambiguous Intermediate Scrutiny
While classifications based on stereotypes generally will fail
intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has recognized that
46
“physical differences between men and women . . . are enduring.” In
Nguyen, the Court relied on these differences in upholding § 1409(a)
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which imposes a set of
requirements on unwed fathers but not on unwed mothers for
47
purposes of transferring U.S. citizenship to children born abroad. In
addition to the physical-presence requirement of § 1401, which was
not at issue in Nguyen, § 1409(a) imposes the following requirements
on unwed citizen fathers:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is
established by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time
of the person’s birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of
18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s
residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing
under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
48
competent court.

Unwed citizen–mothers, by contrast, only need to meet § 1409(c)’s
49
one-year physical-presence requirement.
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the statutory sex classification
must “serve important governmental objectives” and the
“discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to

46.
47.
48.
49.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a) (West 2010).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(c) (West 2010).
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50

the achievement of those objectives.” In Nguyen, the Court posited
that the government had two objectives. First, the government wanted
51
assurance “that a biological parent–child relationship exists.”
Second, it wanted to ensure the existence of “real, everyday ties that
provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn,
52
the United States.”
Given the number of Americans abroad, the Court noted that
Congress could be concerned about the potential for burgeoning
citizenship claims based solely on “male parentage subject to no
condition save the father’s previous length of residence in this
53
country.” The dissent, however, claimed that the majority only
54
hypothesized about the purposes of § 1409(a), whereas heightened
scrutiny requires the Court to “inquire into the actual purposes of the
55
discrimination.” The dissent also argued that the majority failed to
explain the importance of these governmental interests as required by
56
heightened scrutiny.
The Court held that the discriminatory sections of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act were substantially related to the
57
government’s two interests. First, by imposing a higher burden on
fathers than on mothers, the statute provided assurance of a biological
relationship because “[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated
with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. . . . In the case of
the mother, the relationship is verifiable from the birth itself[,]” but
58
fathers need to take additional steps to verify their paternity. Second,
with regard to ensuring meaningful ties between the child, the parent,
and the U.S., the Court relied on the fact that a mother must be
present at the birth of her child, but not a father. This difference is
important inasmuch as “the opportunity for a meaningful relationship
between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth”

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
added).
56.
57.
58.

Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 76 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996)) (emphasis
Id. at 77–79.
Id. at 65 (majority opinion).
Id. at 62.
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for the mother. The father, by contrast, need not even know that the
60
child was conceived.
The dissent, however, claimed that the majority’s substantialrelationship analysis failed to consider the “tight fit” required
between the means and ends because it ignored the availability of
61
sex-neutral alternatives. The dissent queried, for example, why §
1409(a) could not simply require that the parent be present at birth or
have knowledge of the birth in order to show the opportunity for a
62
meaningful relationship. This alternative would not draw a facial
63
distinction between mothers and fathers. Moreover, “[t]here is no
reason, other than stereotype” why a mother’s presence at birth gives
64
assurance of an opportunity for relationship, but a father’s does not.
Because the physical differences between men and women do not
sufficiently justify the discriminatory classification, the dissent
maintained that the majority misapplied intermediate scrutiny, which
65
requires an “exceedingly persuasive” justification.
C. Congress’s “Plenary Power” over Immigration: Fiallo v. Bell
66

The Supreme Court’s decision in Fiallo v. Bell further
complicates the issue of what level of scrutiny to apply in the
immigration and naturalization context. The Court underscored “the
67
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation” by
upholding an INS provision that recognizes a mother’s relationship
with her illegitimate child, but not a father’s, for purposes of
68
preferential immigration status. Deferring to Congress’s broad
69
constitutional powers in immigration matters, the Court declined to
apply heightened scrutiny and instead maintained that “it is not the
judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for
70
the legislative decision.”

59. Id. at 65.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 86.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id. at 76 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
66. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
67. Id. at 792.
68. Id. at 788–89.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization.”).
70. Id. at 799.
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IV. HOLDING
In Flores-Villar, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment and upheld the INS’s disparate physical presence
requirements, echoing much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
71
Nguyen. The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that
intermediate scrutiny applies to statutes within the scope of
72
Congress’s immigration and naturalization power. It held that even
though § 1401(a)(7) imposes an additional physical-presence
requirement on unwed fathers—as distinct from the “paternal
connection” requirements at issue in Nguyen—”the government’s
interests are no less important, and the particular means no less
73
substantially related to those objectives, than in Nguyen.”
First, the court theorized that one “obvious rational basis” for the
disparate physical-presence requirement is ensuring that children are
74
not “stateless” at birth. Because many countries base citizenship on
bloodline and not on place of birth, a child born to an unwed U.S.
citizen–mother overseas might only be able to acquire citizenship at
the time of birth through the mother. To the court, this policy “clearly
demonstrates a ‘rational basis’ for Congress’ more lenient policy
75
towards illegitimate children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers.”
Second, as in Nguyen, the court recognized the government’s
interest in assuring a link between the father, the U.S., and the child
76
who is to be a citizen. In response to Flores-Villar’s contention that a
father’s length of residence in the U.S. says nothing about the father–
child relationship, the court referenced Nguyen’s discussion of
Congress’s substantial discretion to choose what interests to promote
and what “easily administered” means it may use to further those
77
interests.
In effect, while the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the fit is not
perfect” between the discriminatory means and the ends, it
nonetheless concluded that those means are “sufficiently persuasive

71. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1878 (2010).
72. Id. at 995.
73. Id. at 996.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 997.
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in light of the virtually plenary power that Congress has to legislate in
78
the area of immigration and citizenship.”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Flores-Villar’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments
Flores-Villar maintains that intermediate scrutiny should apply to
because the statute creates a sex-based classification by having
different requirements for unwed fathers than unwed mothers when
79
transmitting citizenship to a foreign-born child. His first argument
concerns the proper application of intermediate scrutiny, which is
unsurprising given the Nguyen majority’s ambiguous level of review
80
and the Ninth Circuit’s perplexing use of rational basis language.
Intermediate scrutiny requires courts to inquire into the actual
purpose of the discriminatory residency requirements, instead of
accepting the government’s post hoc rationale that the statute seeks
81
to avoid statelessness. Flores-Villar points to the hearings
surrounding the adoption of the Nationality Act of 1940 (which is the
precursor of the statute in question) as revealing the stereotypes
82
behind the law. During the hearings, a State Department
representative claimed that a “non-marital child would, naturally, be
raised by her mother, not her father: ‘If the child only has one legal
parent, because it is illegitimate, if that parent, the mother, is a
83
national, the child acquires nationality.’” Flores-Villar claims that the
concern about statelessness does not enter into the congressional
84
hearings at all. Thus, the government’s supposed interest in avoiding
statelessness is far from the “exceedingly persuasive justification”
85
required to pass intermediate scrutiny.
Flores-Villar next argues that the government’s second asserted
interest for the physical-presence requirement—that there be an
opportunity for a meaningful relationship between the citizen–parent,
78. Id. at 996.
79. Id.
80. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (U.S. June 18,
2010).
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 38.
85. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
731 (1982)).
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the child, and the United States—likewise fails intermediate scrutiny,
86
thus making Nguyen inapposite here. In Nguyen, the Court justified
the additional steps a father needs to take to demonstrate an
opportunity for parental connection because of the biological
differences between mothers and fathers; birth itself creates the
opportunity for mothers, but not for fathers. Here, Flores-Villar
argues that “[n]o biological difference between men and women
suggests that women form stronger ties to the United States in shorter
87
time periods than men.” Without this biological justification, the fit
between the statute’s discriminatory means and the government’s
asserted interest falls wide of the narrow tailoring required to survive
intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, Flores-Villar argues that the level of deference owed to
Congress regarding the entry of aliens into the United States per
Fiallo should not “carry over into determinations of who is a citizen as
88
of birth.” In essence, the question of citizenship at birth is different
89
from questions of immigration and naturalization. Moreover, the
supremacy of the Constitution is abrogated if Congress is allowed to
trump the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in the exercise
90
of a “plenary power.”
B. The Government’s (Respondent’s) Arguments
The Government argues that rational-basis review should apply in
deference to Congress’s constitutional authority over naturalization,
91
which includes authority over citizenship matters. It is not “the
province of the Judiciary to determine which foreign-born persons
should be permitted to become members of our society in the first
92
place.” To maintain this separation of powers, Congress’s
determinations regarding statutory citizenship are entitled to
93
deference by the reviewing court.

86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 18 (“Congressional power is limited by the Constitution itself . . . .”)
(quotation marks omitted) (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)).
91. Brief for the United States at 16, Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (Aug. 27,
2010).
92. Id. at 16–17.
93. Id. at 15.
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Even under a heightened standard of review, the Government
argues that Congress’s choice to impose a lower physical-presence
requirement on unwed mothers than on unwed fathers is
“substantially related to the important government interest of
94
reducing statelessness.” First, unwed mothers and unwed fathers are
not similarly situated with regard to the potential for having stateless
children:
[W]hen Congress enacted a new naturalization code in 1940, it
understood that a majority of countries employed jus sanguinis
laws [citizenship by blood] rather than jus soli laws [citizenship
based on place of birth]. . . . In most of those countries, when a
child was born to an unwed mother, the only parent legally
recognized as the child’s parent at the time of birth usually was the
mother. Although the child’s father could subsequently obtain the
status of a legal parent through legitimation . . . the establishment
of such a relationship did not occur as a result of the birth alone.
Thus, the only parent eligible to transmit citizenship at the time of
95
birth . . . was the mother.

To allow an unwed mother to transmit her U.S. citizenship more
easily in this scenario, Congress chose to lessen the physical-presence
requirement through § 1409(c). The physical presence required for all
other persons to transfer citizenship—married men, married women,
96
and unwed fathers—remained the § 1401(a)(7) standard. In keeping
with this reading of the statute, it is precisely because of the biological
difference between men and women with respect to childbirth that
Congress adopted a shorter physical-presence requirement for unwed
mothers.
Accordingly, the Government contends that Congress was not
97
motivated by impermissible stereotypes in enacting § 1409(c).
Contrary to Flores-Villar’s claim, the Government maintains that
98
Congress was explicitly motivated by the statelessness concern.
When Congress added § 1409(c) in 1952, the Senate Report
“explained that the change was appropriate to further ‘insure[] that
99
the child shall have a nationality at birth.’”

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32–33 (citations omitted).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 30.
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 39 (1952)).
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With regard to the fit between the discriminatory means and the
asserted objective of reducing statelessness, the Government argues
that Congress did not need to tailor the law with “mathematical
100
precision” in order to pass heightened scrutiny. Rather, it could
address the problem it found to be most pressing—here, the potential
for statelessness. Congress’s decision to do so “on a categorical basis
rather than based on a case-by-case . . . assessment . . . represents a
legitimate accommodation of foreign policy, feasibility, and other
101
interests.”
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
Only eight justices will deliberate in Flores-Villar; Justice Kagan
recused herself because of her position as the U.S. Solicitor General
when the case was argued in the district court. This makes a tie or a 53 split in favor of the Government the most likely outcomes.
Regardless, there are many options open to the Court, and most turn
on whether and how it will apply intermediate scrutiny.
The Court, however, may not reach the merits for two reasons.
First, Flores-Villar may lack standing to assert the equal-protection
102
rights of his father. As the Government points out, it is not FloresVillar himself who has suffered the alleged sex-based discrimination,
103
but rather his father. This is problematic for standing because a
party ordinarily cannot seek judicial relief by claiming the rights of a
104
third party. The second potential problem lies in providing FloresVillar with a remedy. Even if the Court determined that there was an
equal-protection violation, it would have to decide how to fix it: if the
Court required that unwed mothers meet the higher physicalpresence requirement of fathers, then Flores-Villar’s citizenship claim
105
would still fail. During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts
hypothesized that the Court could “look ahead” and say that “the
only remedy that we are going to be able to give [Flores-Villar] is a

100. Id. at 41.
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 10–11.
104. Id. at 11 (citing Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)).
105. See id. at 45 (“Even if this Court were to determine that Congress’s decision . . . violates
equal protection principles, petitioner would not be entitled to the relief he seeks—a reversal of
his criminal conviction based on a determination that he has been a U.S. citizen from birth. . . .
[T]he proper way to cure any equal protection violation would be to apply the longer physicalpresence requirements in Section 1401 . . . to unwed citizen mothers.”).
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remedy that isn’t going to benefit him regardless of how the merits
106
are decided, therefore we don’t reach the merits.” It seems more
likely, however, that the Court will confront the equal-protection
claim. As Justice Kennedy posited, the Court “usually talk[s] about
substance first, remedy second,” inferring that it would be illogical to
conclude that “because the remedies are so difficult,” the Court
107
should abdicate its responsibility of scrutiny.
In deciding on the proper level of review, the Court will need to
grapple with the degree of deference owed to Congress in the
108
immigration context.
If Fiallo’s deference only extends to
congressional determinations about admitting aliens into the country,
a lower standard of review is unwarranted here because this is a case
109
about who is a citizen at birth. But, as the Government points out,
Fiallo also dealt with the constitutional interests of U.S. citizens, and
“rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny [of
immigration statutes] is required when the constitutional rights of
110
citizens are implicated.”
While this precedential question is sticky, the Court would be
correct in concluding that constitutional protections are supreme over
congressional enactments; after all, applying a lower level of scrutiny
to constitutional violations in a particular arena of legislation
111
amounts to an abrogation of the judicial role. Nevertheless, the
Court might sidestep the whole issue by taking a page from Nguyen
and refusing to answer the Fiallo deference question, finding no
112
equal-protection violation in the first place.
If the Court proceeds to apply intermediate scrutiny it will need to
determine its proper application. The majority in Nguyen provided
little guidance, and this legacy of ambiguity can be seen in the Ninth
Circuit’s confusing use of “rational basis” language during its

106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, United States v. Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Transcript].
107. Id. at 24.
108. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
109. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 15 (claiming that Fiallo addresses the
admission of aliens, but not citizenship by birth).
110. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 20.
111. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[I]n declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.”) (emphasis added).
112. See Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 533 U.S. 53, 72 (2001)
(deciding not to assess the implications of Fiallo, as there was no equal protection violation).
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113

ostensible intermediate scrutiny review. During oral arguments,
Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that if something like “rational
basis plus” is used to resolve this case, the Court will continue “sort of
tweaking the definitions and creating more variations on our review
114
standard.”
A stricter form of intermediate scrutiny would require the
Government to show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for its
115
discriminatory classification,
and to demonstrate that the
116
classification “substantially relates” to that interest. Under this
rubric, the Government would have a difficult time persuading the
Court that a discriminatory physical-presence requirement is
substantially related to reducing statelessness. A short physicalpresence requirement may indeed reduce statelessness among
illegitimate children, inasmuch as it makes it easier for a parent to
transfer citizenship. But there is no reason why the requirement must
only apply to mothers. That is, the presence requirement itself might
relate to reducing statelessness; the discriminatory classification does
not. This conclusion is underscored if the Court seriously considers
the availability of sex-neutral alternatives to the law, which is
117
generally quite important in heightened scrutiny contexts. Here, it
seems clear that Congress could have subjected all parents to the
lower physical-presence requirement in pursuing its goal of reducing
statelessness.
Scrutiny questions aside, the Court may hold that the physicalpresence requirements violate equal protection based on Nguyen
alone. Even under the Nguyen Court’s questionable level of scrutiny,
it held that classifications will pass muster only if they are justified by
118
the biological differences between the sexes. Flores-Villar argues
here that no biological differences justify a longer physical-presence
119
requirement for fathers than for mothers. The Government notes
that Congress imposes physical-presence requirements primarily out
113. See United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 1878 (2010) (inquiring into the “obvious rational basis” for the disparate physical-presence
requirements).
114. Transcript, supra note 106, at 29.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
116. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
117. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 63 (majority opinion) (“Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with
regard to proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of different rules for each is neither
surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective.”).
119. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 9.
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of “a legitimate desire to ensure some tie between this country and
120
one who seeks citizenship.” The asserted governmental interest
served by the shorter presence requirement, however, is reducing
121
statelessness —an interest unrelated to that of assuring ties between
parent, child, and country. The biological difference between men and
women, then does not relate to the Government’s interest in physicalpresence requirements.
However, if the Court chooses the Nguyen approach to
intermediate scrutiny without adding rigor, it is likely to tolerate a
looser fit between the means and the ends. This loose tailoring would
permit a relatively tenuous biological argument to justify the
discriminatory presence requirements. Such a “rational-basis plus”
kind of review would also allow the Court to ignore the fact that sexneutral alternatives are available. Furthermore, it would give credence
to the Government’s pragmatic argument that “apply[ing] different
physical presence rules on a categorical basis rather than based on a
case-by-case . . . assessment” is perfectly acceptable in light of
122
administrative and efficiency concerns. After all, Nguyen seems to
allow Congress to enact “an easily administered scheme” where a sex123
neutral or case-by-case analysis would prove too onerous.
VII. CONCLUSION
Were the Court to take a lenient approach to intermediate
scrutiny, it would be in danger of losing sight of the purpose behind
the Equal Protection Clause. At the heart of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection is the promise that individuals will not
face discrimination simply because they belong to a particular class;
“[i]nherent differences between men and women . . . remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or
124
for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” Where a

120. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 21 (quotation marks omitted) (citing
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 41–42.
123. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69 (“Congress would of course be entitled to advance the
interest of ensuring an actual, meaningful relationship in every case . . . . Or Congress could
excuse compliance with the formal requirements when an actual father-child relationship is
proved. It did neither here, perhaps because of the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties of
proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular bond or tie. Instead, Congress enacted an
easily administered scheme . . . .”).
124. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (emphasis added).
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father who raises a child cannot transfer U.S. citizenship as easily as a
mother, the spirit of equal protection is offended. Without an
extremely persuasive justification for the offense, substance
impermissibly gives way to stereotype.

